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Highlights
•	 Revenues	 of	 “standard”	 power	 generation	 assets	 in	 the	 EU	 are	 strongly	
impacted	by	massive	renewables.	Due	concerns	have	emerged	on	the	ability	
of	“energy	only”	markets	to	ensure	generation	adequacy	over	the	next	decade.	
Some	Member	 States	 are	 considering	 “national	 only”	 generation	 adequacy	
mechanisms,	 conceived	 to	address	 issues	 that	are	 specific	 to	each	Member	
State.	Therefore	it	is	not	obvious	that	a	common	“regional”	mechanism	will	
spontaneously	reach	a	consensus.	
•	 “National	 autarkical	 generation	 adequacy	 policies”	 -	 if	 not	 contradictory	 -	
are	 inevitably	expensive.	Significant	benefits	can	be	achieved	when	sharing	
resources	and	managing	the	stress	events	at	a	multilateral	scale.	To	be	efficient	
all	national	adequacy	policies	should	acknowledge	the	multi-lateral	dimen-
sion	of	the	adequacy	issue	in	the	EU,	and	take	into	account	(either	‘explicitly’	
or	‘implicitly’)	the	actual	contribution	of	cross-border	resources.	
•	 However	Europeans	do	not	seem	ready	for	this	demanding	Europeanization.	
Today	the	set	of	tools	that	we	need	is	still	to	be	defined	before	thinking	about	
any	implementation.	We	still	have	to	deliver	a	proper	Europeanization	of	the	
national	adequacy	mechanisms.
•	 How	to	do	any	coherent	assessment	of	the	EU	and	each	Member	State	actual	
generation	adequacy	without	an	EU	harmonisation	of	methodology,	data	base	
and	scenarios?	How	should	we	allocate	among	various	players	the	responsi-
bilities	 for	energy	delivery,	while	 the	 true	contribution	of	 interconnections	
can	only	be	known	in	real-time,	and	results	from	a	conjunction	of	conditions	
in	different	systems?	And	how	to	allocate	energy	at	times	of	scarcity,	consid-
ering	 efforts	made	 through	heterogeneous	 adequacy	mechanisms?	Can	we	
combine	any	set	of	compatible	economic	incentives	with	the	needed	spirit	of	
solidarity	embodied	in	our	EU	treaty?	
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1. Background: the emergence of national 
generation adequacy policies
The	 ability	 of	 energy-only	 markets	 to	 provide	 an	 adequate	
revenue	 stream	 to	 investors	 in	 generation	 assets	has	 recently	
been	questioned	 in	Europe.	The	“missing	money”	 issue	 is	 an	
old	debate,	which	 led	 -	 for	 instance	 -	 to	 the	 implementation	
of	 several	 capacity	 remuneration	mechanisms	 in	 the	 United	
States	and	Latin	America1.	In	Europe,	this	debate	is	renewed	by	
the	large-scale	development	of	 intermittent	renewable	energy	
sources	(RES),	such	as	wind	turbines	and	solar	panels.	
Actually	 the	 current	wave	 of	 investment	 in	RES	 capacities	 is	
driven	 by	 support	 schemes.	Only	 the	 “outside	 of	 the	 energy	
market”	revenues	make	RES	investment	attractive	and	always	
profitable...	 even	 in	 case	 of	 gigantic	 generation	 overcapacity	
and	historically	low	wholesale	energy	prices.	Furthermore	very	
significant	amount	of	flexible	and	dispatchable	generation	(or	
consumption	or	storage)	assets	is	needed	to	ensure	the	system	
security	 vis-à-vis	 the	 high	 RES	 intermittency.	 In	 the	 mean-
time	all	 the	 “classical”	flexible	generation	assets	 are	used	 less	
often	 than	before	 (on	average).	Several	 concerns	have	conse-
quently	been	raised	regarding	the	attractiveness	for	investment	
in	capacity	of	a	“wholesale	energy	only	market”	remuneration	
based	on	highly	volatile	 and	actually	 lower	wholesale	 energy	
prices.	
The	 today	 “missing	money”	 issue	 that	 EU	 faces	 has	 an	 his-
torical	dimension	(a	RES	public	push	despite	a	 low	demand)	
that	could	be	addressed	if	the	excess	capacity	of	generation	was	
decommissioned.	However	it	is	not	clear	if	and	how	we	might	
reach	a	sustainable	“plateau”	of	flexible	and	dispatchable	assets	
after	such	a	bloody	“assets	cleaning”.	
What	 the	European	systems	need	 is	 that	 the	right	amount	of	
back-up	resources	will	also	be	able	to	provide	the	right	amount	
and	profile	of	flexibility,	to	cope	with	the	system	variability	of	
intermittent	RES.	Concerns	have	 therefore	 emerged	over	 the	
ability	of	the	existing	sequence	of	wholesale	markets	(from	Day	
Ahead	to	balancing	via	intraday)	to	drive	the	system	required	
investment	in	flexibility.	In	the	today’s	EU	already	“generation	
adequacy”	is	not	only	ensuring	an	abstract	right	volume	of	dis-
patchable	 resources;	 it	 has	 clearly	become	 ensuring	 the	 right	
“flexibility	mix”	for	the	system.	
Of	course	the	needs	and	the	resources	of	Member	States	differ	
substantially.	France	aims	at	dealing	with	a	high	peak	demand	
and	electrical	heating	when	temperatures	are	low.	The	Spanish	
CCGT	 fleet	 bleeds	 and	 the	 corresponding	 LNG	 terminals	
sleep...	 in	a	peninsula...	 as	 long	as	wind	blows	or	 sun	 shines.	
Such	 countries	 differences	 are	 resulting	 in	 a	wave	 of	 hetero-
1.	 See	for	instance	Joskow	(2013)	“Symposium	on	‘Capacity	Markets’”	Eco-
nomics	of	Energy	and	Environmental	Policy	2.2
geneous	 proposals	 for	 capacity	 remuneration	 mechanisms.	
With	 centralised,	 targeted	 “strategic	 reserves”	 in	Belgium,	 or	
“decentralised”,	market-wide	capacity	obligations	on	suppliers	
in	France.	It	is	therefore	unlikely	that	a	harmonised	European	
capacity	 remuneration	 mechanism	 will	 ever	 spontaneously	
emerge.	How	then	to	avoid	too	many	and	too	strong	national	
“lock-in/s”	derailing	our	historic	move	towards	an	 integrated	
European	market?	On	the	one	hand,	it	should	be	more	clever	
than	ever	to	pool	scarcely-used	back-up	resources	at	a	multi-
lateral	scale.	While	reducing	the	total	flexibility	needs	by	aggre-
gating	regionally	 the	variable	production	of	 intermittent	RES	
(all	RES	do	not	fluctuate	the	same	way	at	the	same	time).	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 some	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 mecha-
nisms	are	currently	being	implemented.	It	is	not	clear	yet	how	
these	schemes	will	impact	the	actual	integration	of	our	internal	
energy	market;	or	prevent	(pre-empt?)	the	activation	of	non-
generation	 adequacy	 resources	 (as	 demand	 response,	 storage	
or	interconnectors).	
We	do	have	to	analyse	the	scope	and	to	understand	the	func-
tioning	 of	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 policies	 in	 our	 EU	
integrated	electricity	market.	
Our	policy	brief	first	explains	why	handling	security	of	supply	
on	 a	 purely	 national	 way	 will	 be	 prohibitively	 expensive	 if	
not	 purely	 counter-productive	 (with	 countries	 harming	 each	
other).	EU	and	Member	States	do	not	need	and	cannot	afford	
a	 new	 type	 of	 over-capacity:	 an	 over-capacity	 of	 “adequacy	
redundancies”	which	can	only	distort	more	and	more	energy	
exchanges	and	investments	in	the	internal	energy	market.	The	
Commission	repeats	being	determined	not	to	allow	a	general-
ised	split	of	the	internal	market	by	autarkical	capacity	remuner-
ation	mechanisms.	Of	course	security	of	supply	has	been	legiti-
mately	 and	 traditionally	 addressed	 only	 country	 by	 country	
before	the	building	of	the	internal	EU	market.	Of	course	our	EU	
Member	States	still	have	different	SoS	needs	and	different	SoS	
tool	boxes	as	reflected	by	the	heterogeneity	of	reliability	stand-
ards	and	balancing	arrangements.	However	a	Europeanization	
of	 national	 capacity	 remuneration	mechanisms	 is	 needed:	 it	
cannot	be	avoided	and	has	to	start.	In	the	second	part	of	this	
policy	brief,	we	identify	several	key	challenges	on	our	journey	
to	the	coming	Europeanization	of	national	capacity	remunera-
tion	mechanisms.	
2. A Europeanization of national 
generation adequacy tool kits is 
unavoidable
A	fully	unique	and	fully	harmonised	adequacy	policy	cannot	
be	developed	“in	Brussels”(or	Ljubljana)	and	implemented	all	
over	Europe,	as	Member	States	face	too	different	needs,	based	
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on	too	different	systems	and	resources	and	address	legitimately	
different	 security	 objectives	 or	 energy	 policies	 (the	 former	
“2020	 policy”	 is	 ending:	 toward	 2030	 “fais	 ce	 qui	 te	 plaît”	 /	
“Honny	soit	qui	mal	y	pense”).	 It	 is	certainly	not	a	reason	to	
not	look	after	coherence	and	consistency	across	nationally	spe-
cific	schemes:	think	only	one	minute	about	how	to	measure	the	
adequacy	contribution	of	cross-border	 resources.	 In	 this	 sec-
tion,	we	will	also	look	at	the	Commission	approach	as	it	already	
has	(Member	States	liking	it	or	not)	strong	legal	tools	to	oppose	
autarkical	approaches	in	the	name	of	“free	movement	of	goods”	
and	of	“state	aid	control”.	
2.1 Autarkical generation adequacy policies are 
inevitably more expensive
The	benefits	of	a	multi-lateral	(or	regional)	approach	towards	
security	 of	 supply	 are	 obvious	 by	 comparison	 to	 a	 national	
autarkical	 approach.	 First,	 current	 level	 of	 reserve	 margin	
and	 future	 needs	 vary	 across	 different	Member	 States.	 Some	
of	 these	 states	 experience	 large	 amount	 of	 surplus	 capacity,	
while	the	reserve	margins	are	shrinking	in	some	neighbouring	
countries.	 A	 multi-lateral	 reserve	 margin	 will	 therefore	 be	
better	 than	 the	 smallest	 national	 reserve	margins,	 even	with	
constraints	coming	of	limited	interconnections.	Second,	stress	
events	across	neighbouring	countries	are	not	perfectly	corre-
lated,	which	means	that	the	surplus	capacities	will	not	generally	
be	needed	at	the	same	time	by	the	different	national	systems.	
Of	 course	 the	 stressing	 events	 are	 also	 partially	 correlated:	
weather	 correlations	 between	 neighbouring	 countries	 can	
result	in	similar	hourly	load	among	different	systems;	as	well	as	
a	correlation	of	weather-driven	output	from	intermittent	RES	
among	these	systems.	However,	even	when	stress	events	with	
low	capacity	margins	occur	within	the	same	period	(e.g.	during	
the	winter	in	Northern	Europe),	they	are	rarely	coincident.2
Excluding	 the	activation	of	cross-border	resources	 from	gen-
eration	adequacy	policies	will	therefore	lead	to	higher	overall	
costs,	as	 the	potential	 to	 share	capacity	 resources	available	at	
a	multi-lateral	 scale	 is	 lost.	The	 costs	 of	 provision	 aiming	 at	
ensuring	national	self-security	were	estimated	to	3.0	to	7.5	bil-
lion	euros	per	year	from	2015	to	2030,	reducing	the	benefits	of	
an	integrated	energy	market	by	more	than	20%.3
2.2 Generation adequacy policies will impact energy 
prices 
Generation	 adequacy	 (the	 availability	 of	 sufficient	 resources	
capacity	when	needed	–	incl.	activation	of	demand	switching)	
2.	 Pöyry	(2013).	“Analysis	of	the	correlation	of	stress	periods	in	the	electric-
ity	markets	in	GB	and	its	interconnected	systems.”	Report	to	Ofgem.
3.	 Booz	&	Company,	Newbery	et	al.	(2013).	“Benefits	of	an	Integrated	Euro-
pean	Energy	Market.”	Report	for	the	Directorate-General	Energy	of	the	
European	Commission.
and	flexibility	(the	ability	to	adapt	production	or	consumption	
to	 the	 system	 needs	within	 a	 given	 timeframe)	 are	 two	 cor-
nerstones	 of	 a	 reliable	 power	 system	hosting	 a	 high	 share	 of	
intermittent	RES.	However	the	issue	of	flexibility	is	sometimes	
decoupled	 from	the	generation	adequacy	 issue.	One	assumes	
some	long-term	mechanisms	would	be	implemented	to	ensure	
generation	adequacy	on	the	one	hand,	while	looking	at	other	
short-term	 signals	 from	 day-ahead	 to	 balancing	 horizon	 to	
ensure	 an	 optimal	 dispatch	 of	 generation	 and	 activation	 of	
flexible	 system	 components	 (either	 generation,	 demand	 or	
storage).	
Such	 a	 partition	 between	 long	 term	 adequacy	 building	 and	
short	term	flexibility	activation	seems	however	misleading.	The	
ability	 of	 system	 resources	 to	 start-up	 and	 ramp-up	 quickly,	
to	 cycle	 frequently,	 and	 to	 operate	 at	 low	 minimum	 loads	
becomes	 inevitably	 critical	 in	 a	 system	 hosting	 a	 high	 share	
of	 intermittent	RES.	For	a	 thermal	unit	with	significant	vari-
able	costs,	it	may	imply	generating	at	a	loss	so	as	to	be	available	
when	needed.	Generation	adequacy	incentives	end	inevitably	
impacting	 prices	 and	 flexibility	 remuneration	 in	 the	 “short	
term”	markets.	If	the	generation	adequacy	policy	is	biased	ex	
ante	towards	a	given	set	of	resources	(by	technology	and	loca-
tion)	further	distorted	conditions	are	introduced	in	the	short	
term	markets	acting	ex	post.	
2.3 The European Commission has the legal 
weaponry for a minimal Europeanization of 
generation adequacy
Member	States	have	a	unilateral	right	to	influence	the	general	
structure	of	 their	energy	supply	(=	their	systems’	energy	mix	
+	 the	private	 /	public	mix	of	 industry	ownership).	They	also	
have	a	legitimate	right	to	define	the	conditions	and	operation	of	
security	of	supply	within	their	boundaries.	They	also	bear	the	
complementary	national	regulatory	frames	and	authorities	(the	
NRAs).	These	strongly	national	foundations	of	the	EU	power	
systems	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 diversity	 of	 national	 balancing	
arrangements	and	reliability	standards.	The	Electricity	Direc-
tive	 20009/72/EC	 (article	 7)	 allows	Member	 States	 to	 imple-
ment	 “a tendering procedure or any procedure equivalent in 
terms of transparency and non-discrimination”,	in	the	interests	
of	security	of	supply.	
All	 of	 this	 said,	 the	 European	 Commission	 also	 has	 a	 solid	
weaponry	coming	from	internal	market’s	freedom	for	trade	or	
competition	policy	for	state	aid.	That	is	why	the	Commission	
will	 not	 let	 national	 schemes	 tearing	 into	 pieces	 the	 integra-
tion	of	internal	energy	market.	In	the	Commission’s	guidance	
on	public	interventions,	it	is	clearly	stated	that	“mechanisms to 
ensure generation adequacy should be open to all capacity which 
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can effectively contribute to meeting the required generation ade-
quacy standard, including from other Member States”.	
In	 order	 to	 prevent	 distortion	 of	 competition	 and	 trade,	 the	
Commission	has	two	powerful	weapons.	First	energy	is	legally	
a	 good	 and	 as	 such,	 the	 dispositions	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 treaty	
regarding	free	movement	of	goods	apply.	It	prevents	unilateral	
restrictions	of	energy	imports	and	exports.	Second	even	for	a	
legitimate	state	intervention	the	guidance	states	that	“Member 
States, when intervening to ensure generation adequacy, should 
choose the intervention which least distorts cross border trade 
and the effective functioning of the internal electricity market”.	
The	Commission	will	use	its	State	Aid	strong	powers	to	prevent	
or	 cure	any	public	 intervention	 that	would	unilaterally	harm	
or	 discriminate	 cross-border	 trade.	 However	 this	 Europe-
anization	process	will	be	quite	demanding	as	the	“technology	
neutrality”	 been	 required	 covers	 all	 “generation	 +	 storage	 +	
demand	response”	alternative	technologies	and	assets.	
3. A frame for a workable 
Europeanization of national generation 
adequacy mechanisms
It	 is	 now	 clear	 that	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 mecha-
nisms	must	take	into	account	the	contribution	of	cross-border	
resources.	Either	to	avoid	the	extra	costs	of	autarky	or	to	ensure	
compatibility	 with	 the	 guidance	 of	 European	 Commission.	
However	no	one	so	 far	has	defined	a	ready-to-use	tool-kit	of	
practical	and	workable	efficient	solutions.	We	propose	in	this	
section	what	could	be	the	main	tools	ensuring	a	minimal	Euro-
peanization	 of	 national	 generation	 adequacy	mechanisms.	A	
first	tool	is	a	methodology	allowing	an	assessment	of	the	ade-
quacy	needs	and	a	measurement	of	the	contribution	of	cross-
border	resources.	A	second	is	a	frame	of	legitimate	remunera-
tion	 and	 allocation	of	 responsibilities	 for	 services	 delivery	 at	
activation.	A	third	and	last	tool	is	a	multi-lateral	frame	to	coor-
dinate	this	activation	of	services	at	times	of	general	and	multi-
lateral	scarcity.	Such	a	frame	must	deliver	compatible	economic	
incentives	while	respecting	the	solidarity	principles	embodied	
in	the	EU	treaties.	
3.1 A consistent assessment of adequacy needs and 
measurement of cross-border resources 
ACER,	in	its	report	on	capacity	remuneration	and	the	internal	
market,	 underlines	 that	 “the contribution from cross-border 
capacity to security of supply is often not taken into account 
sufficiently well when addressing national or local adequacy 
concerns”.	CEER	 in	 its	own	2014	 report	 “Assessment	of	 elec-
tricity	 generation	 adequacy	 in	 European	 countries”	 reminds	
the	remaining	difficulties	to	assess	regional	security	of	supply.	
It	states	that	national	generation	adequacy	outlooks	are	estab-
lished	 with	 no	 consistent	 definitions,	 methods	 or	 scenarios,	
and	in	most	cases	with	no	identification	of	the	impact	of	corre-
lated	events	at	regional	level	on	security	of	supply.	It	highlights	
an	 urgent	 need	 for	 harmonisation	 of	 methodologies	 within	
Europe.	 It	 calls	 for	 a	more	 robust	 and	 comprehensive	meth-
odology	to	assess	security	of	supply	at	a	regional	scale,	as	the	
direction	and	the	volume	of	flows	through	interconnectors	are	
the	 result	 of	 partially	 correlated	 conditions	 such	 as	 load	 and	
output	of	intermittent	RES	in	the	different	Member	States.	
We	see	two	ways	of	including	the	contribution	of	cross-border	
resources	 in	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 policies.	 A	 first	
“explicit”	 approach	 is	 to	allow	cross-border	 resources	 to	par-
ticipate	 by	 themselves	 (hence	 “explicitly”)	 in	 the	 process,	 in	
conditions	 objectively	 non-discriminant	 vis-à-vis	 domestic	
resources.	A	second	approach	is	“implicit”	because	it	bases	the	
procurement	process	on	the	domestic	resources,	while	taking	
into	account	the	statistical	contribution	(hence	“implicit”	con-
tribution)	of	all	the	cross-border	resources	to	national	genera-
tion	adequacy.
The	explicit	approach	is	of	course	demanding	-	hence	difficult	
to	 implement.	 It	 is	not	used	 in	France,	 Italy,	 or	 the	UK.	The	
new	Irish	“Single Electricity Market”	has	developed	an	explicit	
approach	based	on	a	mark-up	on	imports,	and	a	mark-down	
on	 exports.	 On	 the	 continent	 the	 widespread	 “market	 cou-
pling”	makes	difficult	 to	 identify	 the	 resources	 imported	and	
the	ones	exported.	Moreover,	the	mark-ups	currently	include	a	
component	calculated	ex-post,	which	is	in	contradiction	with	
the	 implicit	 allocation	 of	 transmission	 capacity.	The	 implicit	
approach	is	therefore	the	only	easy	option	currently	available	
in	coupled	electricity	markets.	
The	implicit	approach	is	not	flawless	either.	Even	a	basic	assess-
ment	 of	 the	 overall	 contribution	 of	 cross-border	 resources	
remains	 challenging.	 Indeed,	 despite	 high	 availability	 factors	
of	 interconnector,	 the	 availability	 of	 flows	 through	 intercon-
nectors	cannot	be	easily	guaranteed	until	real-time.	The	con-
tribution	 of	 interconnectors	 is	 actually	 highly	 variable	 and	
influenced	by	concomitant	conditions	across	several	European	
systems,	 making	 it	 difficult	 to	 foresee	 what	 to	 get	 from	 the	
interconnectors	at	times	of	stress.	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 sophisticated	 probabilistic	methodology,	
Member	 States	 might	 have	 to	 exclude	 the	 participation	 of	
resources	committed	in	another	generation	adequacy	mecha-
nism,	which	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘No double-counting’.	However,	
even	 in	neighbouring	systems,	 scarcity	events	are	rarely	con-
comitant.	 Some	 resources	will	 actually	 contribute	 to	 genera-
tion	adequacy	in	several	systems,	and	at	different	times.	The	‘no	
double-counting’	policy	therefore	overestimates	the	probability	
of	 concomitant	 stress	 events	 in	 different	 systems,	 leading	 to	
multi-lateral	overcapacity	and	extra	costs.	Mitigating	double-
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counting	 might	 come	 from	 refining	 the	 adequacy	 products,	
allowing	 the	 time-periods	 of	 commitments	 to	 match	 more	
accurately	the	needs	of	different	systems.	
First tool needed: assessment of generation 
adequacy at the regional level
How to establish a robust methodology to estimate the contri-
bution of cross-border resources? Is ensuring the consistency of 
national scenarios sufficient? 
Should some “ability” of resources to actually contribute to gen-
eration adequacy in several systems be considered? How then 
to refine national generation adequacy policies so as to avoid 
discrimination of cross-border resources?
3.2 Risk allocation and remuneration of cross-border 
resources
Someone	has	to	be	responsible	for	the	actual	delivery	of	com-
mitted	cross-border	resources.	But	who	really	wants	to	handle	
this	“hot	potato”?	The	actual	contribution	of	committed	cross-
border	 resources	 entails	 three	 prerequisites:	 1)	 the	 resource	
itself	must	be	available,	2)	 the	 interconnector	must	be	physi-
cally	 available,	 and	 3)	 energy	 must	 flow	 through	 the	 inter-
connector.	 Should	 the	 risks	 related	 to	 physical	 availability	 of	
interconnector	 and	 resources	 be	 allocated	 respectively	 to	 the	
interconnector	operator	and	the	resources	owner?	Both	being	
on	 the	 best	 side	 to	manage	 each	 of	 these	 risks?	 But	we	 also	
know	that	the	direction	of	the	flows	and	the	maximum	avail-
able	capacity	of	the	interconnectors	are	influenced	by	Foreign	
concomitant	conditions	born	in	different	Member	States.	Pre-
dicting	 these	 conditions	 over	 the	 long-term	 is	 problematic.	
And	who	could	handle	 the	associated	uncertainty	 in	absence	
of	 a	 regional	 (multi-lateral)	 system	operator?	Allocating	 “too	
much”	risks	to	interconnectors	and/or	cross-border	resources,	
with	actors	being	unable	 to	really	handle	 the	associated	risks	
might	result	in	a	very	reduced	commitment	from	cross-border	
resources.	
Another	 issue	 is	 the	 remuneration	of	 cross-border	 resources.	
How	 to	 remunerate	 the	 overall	 contribution	 of	 cross-border	
resources	 in	case	of	an	“implicit”	approach	of	their	contribu-
tion?	How	should	these	revenues	be	shared	between	the	proper	
cross-border	 resources	 and	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 interconnector	
capacity?	 Should	 cross-border	 resources	 be	 responsible	 for	
explicitly	 booking	 transmission	 and	 interconnector	 capacity?	
Should	interconnectors	receive	a	significant	“capacity	conges-
tion	rent”?	Or	would	it	be	sufficient	to	take	into	account	their	
contribution	to	security	of	supply	when	performing	a	cost-ben-
efit	analysis	at	times	of	investment?	
Second tool needed: allocation of risks and 
remuneration for the contribution of cross-border 
resources
No player can efficiently manage alone all the risks of failed 
delivery of energy from cross-border resources. How should this 
risk then be allocated? And to whom: resource owners? Inter-
connectors? System Operators? 
And how to remunerate the cross-border resources and the 
interconnectors? 
3.3 Definition of rights over the system resources at 
times of extreme scarcity
Generation	adequacy	policies	aim	at	coordinating	the	different	
actors	of	the	system	vis-à-vis	extreme	scarcity	cases.	The	emer-
gence	of	national	CRMs	aiming	at	insuring	consumers	within	
a	certain	system	against	extreme	scarcity	can	become	a	source	
of	conflict	as	Member	States	do	not	live	in	isolation.	The	many	
interdependencies	between	European	power	 systems	make	 it	
difficult	for	a	single	system	–	or	certain	consumers	-	to	ensure	
their	 “own”	 adequacy.	This	 will	 become	 an	 issue	 at	 times	 of	
extreme	scarcity,	when	energy	prices	might	be	unable	to	keep	
energy	 flowing	 towards	 the	 “better”	 insured	 consumers	 or	
towards	highest	social	value	uses.	Current	rules	in	the	market	
coupling	 algorithm	 Euphemia	 for	 instance	 impose	 identical	
curtailment	 ratios	 in	 all	 bidding	 areas,	 independently	 of	 any	
efforts	made	to	avoid	scarcity	situations.	
It	is	clear	that	solidarity	in	the	electricity	sector	at	times	of	scar-
city	matters	as	much	as	it	matters	in	the	gas	sector.	Economic	
incentives	to	insure	against	scarcity	should	not	be	implemented	
to	the	detriment	of	solidarity	at	times	of	emergency	situations	
and	extreme	scarcity.	This	is	all	the	more	important	as	market	
mechanisms	 cannot	 in	 any	 case	 deal	with	 some	 “black	 swan	
events”	that	are	too	high-profile	and	too	hard-to-predict.	This	
is	why	it	is	so	important	to	define	ex-ante	the	scope	of	market	
mechanisms,	and	the	situations	in	which	solidarity	and	other	
arrangements	 should	 apply.	 Generation	 adequacy	 is	 partly	 a	
transnational	 public	 good.	 But	 in	 an	 interdependent	 system,	
everybody	has	to	take	responsibility	to	ensure	a	minimum	reli-
ability	level.	As	some	Member	States	are	willing	to	insure	more	
(at	a	higher	 level)	 their	constituency	against	extreme	scarcity	
than	the	neighbouring	countries,	it	becomes	crucial	to	measure	
the	efforts	made	by	some	consumers	under	heterogeneous	gen-
eration	adequacy	policies	and	the	quantity	of	energy	that	these	
consumers	 are	 entitled	 to	 at	 times	 of	 scarcity.	 If	 a	 common	
frame	cannot	be	found	to	allocate	fairly	the	rights	to	consume	
energy	at	times	of	scarcity,	there	is	a	danger	that	Member	States	
will	turn	towards	autarky	so	as	to	avoid	cross-border	socialisa-
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tion.	Solidarity	principles	should	not	prevent	those	who	paid	
for	a	higher	level	of	insurance	from	enjoying	the	higher	level	of	
adequacy	they	contracted	for.	
The	 contribution	 of	 cross-border	 resources	will	 only	 be	 reli-
able	if	the	priority	of	foreign	demand	with	contracted	system	
adequacy	 is	 ensured	 over	 domestic	 demand	 without	 similar	
adequacy	 commitment.	This	 implies	 that	 national	 adequacy	
policies	 should	 be	 coordinated	 at	 a	 larger	 geographical	 scale	
(through	bilateral	or	multi-lateral	agreements).	A	first	option	
is	 to	make	 sure	 that	 the	 actual	 level	 of	 physical	 rationing	 of	
systems	 (or	 of	 their	 consumers)	 reflects	 the	 efforts	made	 ex	
ante	 to	be	 insured	against	 curtailment.	An	alternative	option	
is	 to	put	 into	place	a	financial	 compensation	 from	systems	–
or	consumers-	 (being	de	 facto	 	benefiting	“ex	post”	 from	the	
activation	of	the	generation	adequacy	policy	-	but	having	not	
contracted	for	it	ex	ante)	to	systems	–	or	consumers	-	(having	
contracted	ex	ante	for	such	a	policy	but	being	not	benefiting	ex	
post	of	the	activation).	In	any	case,	there	is	a	need	for	consistent	
agreements	on	both	the	volume	of	resources	that	the	systems	–	
the	consumers	-	in	each	Member	State	are	entitled	to	in	the	var-
ious	possible	cases	and	the	value	scale	of	the	necessary	financial	
compensation.	It	comes	back	to	valuing	-	at	time	of	high	scar-
city	-	the	efforts	made	by	some	systems	–	some	consumers	-	to	
ensure	their	“own”	adequacy.	
All	this	Policy	Brief	suggests	that	the	EU	debate	on	the	Euro-
peanization	of	generation	adequacy	policy	is	not	going	to	end	
abruptly	or	 too	soon...	 It	 looks	 like	a	 typical	decade-long	EU	
debate…
Third tool needed: allocation of rights to consume 
energy at times of scarcity
Can free-riding be avoided in case when different reliability 
standards and different generation adequacy policies are imple-
mented in Member States?
How to measure the efforts made by consumers under hetero-
geneous generation adequacy policies? How to determine the 
quantity of energy that consumers are entitled to at times of 
scarcity and what should be the value of financial compensa-
tion when necessary? Finally, how to ensure compatibility with 
a spirit of solidarity?
